

June 15

I had a strange and wonderful dream last night. I just woke, and shall quickly tell my faithful word processor about it, because for some reason it has a much more accurate and reliable memory than I. The dream was a lucid dream: I knew I was dreaming. I was aware of the fact that I was here in Edam, but I was sitting at something that seemed like a control-panel, or control room (I must be spending too much time with computers). I had several screens in front of me. I was not alone in the room. There were others, all behind me, looking at the displays over my shoulders. I did not see their faces, as I was facing the controls, but I was speaking with them. They seemed like friends or family, judging by the easy manner of the conversation. I was sitting in this “control booth”, watching the screens that showed the events of the last few days here in Edam. I don’t remember seeing **myself** on the screen; It was as if it was **my** point of view that this “movie” showed. I was simply “reliving”, with many *rewinds* and *fast-forwards* (and an occasional *pause*) my real life experiences, only this time from an **external** point of view. It would not have been so odd, if it were not for the fact, that I was fully aware not only of dreaming, but also that I am dreaming that I am watching things that **really** happened.²¹

It was a pleasant experience, since the last few days here in Edam were extremely enjoyable. I vividly remember watching the short visit Esti and I made to the local Museum. We walked through a reconstruction of a typical Dutch family house in the 16th Century. The house looked just like a doll-house, with low ceilings and tiny multi level bed benches. The "video" of this visit was played several times, and paused in various

²¹ The phenomena of **sleep** and **dreaming** are not receiving enough attention from philosophers. Nowadays, they are practically ignored by the philosophical community, and are left exclusively to the attention of psychologists and cognitive scientists. **Sleep** is a mysterious phenomenon, and no *worldview* is complete without some explanation of it, one that fits with the whole picture. The problem is this: If sleep is nothing but a physical, natural phenomenon, why do we have to **lose our consciousness** in order to rest? Why must our **awareness** be “cut off” from existence **every day**? Something must be **going on** while we sleep; and dreaming proves it: Something is definitely going on. Only it is quite incomprehensible.

An unorthodox attempt to investigate the phenomenon of sleeping and particularly of dreaming, was made by W. Dunne in *An Experiment with Time*³⁹. Dunne is using dreams to explain **time**, another amazing phenomenon (which I plan to discuss later), while using time to explain **dreams**. Dunne must have been strongly influenced by Einstein’s contribution to a new understanding of the concept of time, because he treats time as a fourth spatial coordinate. As human perception is limited to only three spatial coordinates, the fourth must be perceived **sequentially**, slice by slice. Dunne’s *worldview* is, in a sense, *Parmenidean*: A huge, eternal, fixed four-dimensional *substansia*. We humans are of course part of this stationary universe, each of us receiving a partial picture of it: Throughout our lives, we are exposed to a series of temporal three dimensional “slices” of reality. This is clearly a deterministic, *Spinozist worldview*, one that immediately invokes questions regarding the concepts of **free will** and **possibility**. Dunne is not concerned with modality, ethics or free will. He explains dreams as experiences from “slices” that are outside the regular sequential flow of time. After having received (**real**, although displaced) sensory impressions from the past or the future while sleeping, our flexible and resourceful conceptual schemes manage to put these “irrational”, time-displaced impressions into some intelligible framework: “create a story” of the dream; One that can be articulated in the context of the **present** - the time of being awake. I first came across Dunne’s book by accident many years ago, and was deeply impressed.

points. It was a wonderfully odd feeling, and it is quickly fading away as I am now trying to describe it. I'm trying to cling to it – but it quickly fades away, like a falling from heaven. While trying to describe this experience, I am drifting into a feeling of loss and frustration at my inability to reproduce, or at least properly **remember** this dream. All that now remains from the experience are my conceptualized memories. But on the other hand, I am strangely satisfied by the quiet knowledge that such a great feeling **exists**, that it is **possible**. It may be evasive, hard to reproduce, but it is **out there**.

Esti and I just returned from a long post-breakfast walk in Edam. I am slowly forming a detailed picture of the place in my mind. We walked alongside the southern border of town, alongside a wide canal filled with water lilies and ducks. While walking, I thought of the constant evolution of the concept *Edam* in my conceptual scheme: Only three days ago, It was just a beautiful Dutch village, with a picturesque guesthouse called *De Fortuna* in its center. In three short days, this concept changed dramatically: It now has particular streets, shops, bridges. It is becoming more detailed, a **fuller**, more **particular** concept. Only three days ago, the concept *Edam* and the concept *Marken* (another, similar village not far away) were almost synonymous!²²

²² On second thought, different concepts cannot be synonymous. There is no agreed **definition** of the concept *concept*, and it is often considered **primitive, irreducible** (inexplicable in other terms). It is also questionable what discipline is to deal in *concepts*: Epistemology? Semantics? (Formal) Logic? **Bergman** takes concepts seriously; In his *Introduction to the Study of Logic*⁴⁰ he devotes a whole chapter (out of a total of six) to **concepts** and **names**. Traditionally, there is a clear distinction between the two, based on a distinction between *Autosemantic* (or *Categorematic*) expressions and *Sinsemantic* (or *Sincategorematic*) ones. This distinction, first pointed out by Aristotle's late disciples, assumes that some expressions in language have an **intrinsic** meaning, independent of other expressions in the vicinity (in the same sentence, or its implicit presuppositions). The *Autosemantic* expressions, which have a concrete **reference** that directly provides them with **meaning**, are the terms of language known as **names**. *Names* are characterized by the fact that they **refer**, to something **outside** of language. *Names* are names **of** something. At the same time, when a speaker utters a name, he has, **internally**, a mental representation of whatever he takes the name to refer to. This mental representation is the *concept* associated with the *name*. The key problem in the philosophy of language, is how could a *name* refer to two distinct entities at the same time: To an external reference, and to the mental representation of its utterer (or listener).

What is the connection between these two distinct things the *name* refers to, and the **meaning** of the *name*? The meaning is a **third** thing associated with the *name*. It is not (necessarily) the reference, as in *Moses*⁴¹, and it is not (necessarily) the mental representation, as in *atom*. The reference of a name is something external: independent and objective, regardless of speakers (or their existence). The mental representation, on the other hand, is completely subjective: It is internal, and cannot be communicated (except by using the *name*, which does not help in eliminating the subjectivity of the mental representation). The **meaning** supposedly bridges the gap between the completely objective (and directly inaccessible) reference, and complete subjectivity of a particular speaker. Language **assumes**, that there **is** something called **meaning**, which is **intersubjective**: Shared by all speakers, objective, yet accessible by subjectivity. **Meaning** of *names* in a natural language plays a similar role to that of **force** in physics: Physics **assumes** there **is** something objective called **force**, and uses this concept, which was **posited** and defined by physical theory itself, to explain physical phenomena.

When we speak a natural language, we come equipped with a pre-installed presupposition that enables us to participate in the language game⁴²: *Names have a shared, intersubjective meaning*. This presupposition explains the possibility of **mistakes**: Should I realize that my mental representation of a *name* is **different** from its (intersubjective) **meaning**, this mental representation constitutes my **mistake** in (properly)

understanding the *name*. The meaning of a name must therefore be **comparable** to a mental representation: They are made of the same “stuff”. Mental representations are **private**, but **meaning** is **public**. This public meaning, when grasped by a speaker, has the form of a mental representation; One that may be compared to other, **private** mental representations (to determine whether I have the **right** mental representation for a particular *name*). This *worldview* of what happens in natural language hypothesizes an objective domain, a “realm” of objective meanings. This objective realm is easily perceived in the case of **mathematical names**. The meanings of the *names* “1” or “=” are considered as objective (or, rather, intersubjective) as *names* could be, but the debate in the philosophy of mathematics, regarding their ontological status, is still open.⁴³

Be us formalists or Platonists, in using **language** we are presupposing some sort of **objective** domain of meanings. This timeless domain strikes me as very similar to Plato’s *world of Ideas*.⁴⁴ Now we have a three tier structure: A *name* uttered (or heard, or thought of) by a speaker, has **three** denotations, in three distinct and exclusive domains: It has a **reference**, in the ordinary, material ever changing world; It has a **mental representation** in the mind of its speaker, and it has a **meaning**, in the presupposed, intersubjective domain of meanings.

Gottlob Frege made a well-quoted distinction between sense and reference⁴⁵ – a distinction I find problematic. Frege takes *sense* once as **meaning** and once as **mental presentation**. If all speakers were competent in the same language, and shared the same conceptual scheme, there would be no possibility of **mistakes**: The mental representation would always be (identical to) **the** meaning of every *name* in the language. But we **do** make mistakes, and the dichotomy between the objective (reference) and subjective (sense, or mental representation), becomes a **trichotomy**: alongside those two domains lies a third world: **Popper’s “world three”**⁴⁶, also known as Plato’s *world of ideas*, Parmenides’ *way of truth*, Derrida’s *Langue*, etc. etc. As far as “**reality**” is concerned, this third domain is much more “**real**” than the two others: One is completely private, subjective and inaccessible to more than one speaker; The other is inaccessible to **any** speaker, and also hopelessly time-dependent: Before one has a chance to say something about it, it has already irreversibly changed.

But *names* are the **easy** part. What are **predicates**? presumably, they are **groups** of things that have names. but than, **groups** may (and do) have names too! So predicates are also names, but names **of** things that are different in nature than the things that have (simple) *names*. The difference between the two kinds of things denoted by *names* and by names of groups (predicates) is traditionally considered **ontological**: Things with (simple) *names* (the things that *names* denote) are *objects*: They have the ontological status of **existence** (whatever that means), while **groups**, the things that predicates denote, do not “exist” in the same sense of “existence”. Our ontology-laden subject-predicate oriented natural language is operational: It has two kinds of terms, *names* and *predicates*, corresponding to (the) two aspects of reality, or “the world”: The things that **exist** in it, **objects**, and the **properties** of the objects; namely, the **potential** diverse **groupings** of these objects. That is how the subject-predicate structure of language provides the **ontological basis of reality**; the distinction between what there **is** and what **is not**. All it takes for an objectivist, ontological *worldview* to form, is to think in a subject-predicate based language.

Or, the situation may be viewed in reverse: Ontology, **existence**, is presupposed. To provide for this primitive notion, the predicate ‘existence’ has been granted a preferred status: It was declared (by Kant⁴⁷ and others) as a **non** predicate, and endowed with special symbols: (\exists), the existential quantifier, and (\forall), the universal quantifier. Thus language was made **to fit** reality. But, as Parmenides has so long ago pointed out (and his pupil, Zeno⁴⁸, so vividly demonstrated), It was inevitably a self-refuting language to describe a self-refuting *worldview*; From Zeno to Russell⁴⁹, no one in the history of western thought, has conclusively solved what is known as “the great antinomies”⁵⁰, or paradoxes that follow from the objectivist *worldview*. **self reference** is a sheer contradiction: If **referring** is to something **external**, If this is the **essence** of referring, than it is meaningless to speak of **self** (hence internal) **reference**.

Walking along the canal, a man passed us walking his dog. It was the ugliest dog I ever saw. The man was repeatedly throwing a tennis ball for the dog to fetch, and the dog seemed to enjoy the game. But how **ugly** it was! I said to Esti: “What a nice man - he probably volunteered to keep this ugly dog, because nobody else would!” Esti looked at me, mildly surprised: “Do you really think this man thinks his dog is ugly?” She was right, of course. **My** concept, my mental representation of this dog was so much **poorer**, so extremely **different** from that of its owner. Esti said: “You want something to think about? Imagine yourself now conducting a conversation with this man **about** his dog, without the dog around. Tell him why you think his dog is ugly, and learn from him why his dog is beautiful”. I smiled and said: “He says the dog is not only **beautiful**, but extremely loyal and smart. He says the dog has wonderful, deep brown eyes. He says the dog has the smoothest fur. He says...” Esti interrupted me and said: “Don’t get carried away - next you will make him an offer to buy the dog..”

The interesting point about this trivial incident is not the evident relativity of **taste**. It is that while speaking, I **really** changed my taste regarding the appeal of the dog, with no “external” help. I started out with a poor, general concept of **an** ugly dog, one that was (presumably) the product of my senses, and quickly transformed it into something **else**, something of which **ugliness** is not a main characteristic. It has been said (although I cannot remember by who), that *understanding something is understanding why (or how) it is good*. No doubt, the dog’s owner **understood** *his* dog in a much better, **deeper** sense than I understood *mine*. In what sense, then, am I here speaking of **the** dog of **the** man? In the last paragraph, I discussed several distinct concepts all qualifying as **the** dog: The concept the man has of his dog; the concept I initially had of the dog, when it was still (mainly) ugly; The revised concept of a loyal, smart brown-eyed dog. I am describing a variety of **subjective** concepts. But to be (myself) understood by (my) reader, the whole incident is portrayed in an **objective**, intelligible setting, a context which I and the reader (and maybe also the man and his dog) **share**. I could now possibly tell you that the incident never happened (although it **did**), and everything would remain as it was; The physical existence of **a** dog is not at all required to understand the story. All that is required, is the **notion** of an objective **setting**, a shared context. (Did this last paragraph belong below the line?)²³

²³ Let us, for now, accept the fact that **objective meaning** is a necessary presupposition of language. This affirms “**existence**”: the existence of a domain, that is **shared** by all (competent) speakers of the language. This necessary presupposition is responsible for the subject-predicate nature of our language. This is a **logical** consequence, not an empirical observation of the nature of natural languages, (e.g. Chomsky⁵¹), which takes **existence** (handled by the quantifiers) as a special, “elevated” super-predicate. This is how the **objective world** came into existence, together with language. But alas! before we realized what was going on, we had **two** “objective” worlds on our hands: The everyday material common-sense world constituted by everyday common natural language, and another, Platonic world that contains **meanings**, made of the stuff mental representations are made of (“concepts”). No speaker has a full picture of **either** of these worlds; He does not know everything that **is**, and he does not know everything that **could be**. He only has a full picture of **his**, subjective world - his *worldview*.

My teeth ache; No, it is my gum. I have an inflamed gum. Strange. I've had no problems with my teeth and gums for years. Why now? Don't give me your worn down scientific explanations; "because you didn't brush thoroughly; because bacteria are feasting on food remains; because the statistical frequency of inflamed gums in western males is once every 18 months". I'm not looking for sentences containing the term 'gum'. I'm looking for the **reason**. I want to **understand why** I have a gum-ache (Please, don't tell me that it is because I have an inflamed gum. I know that). Do **you** understand what I mean when I want to understand **why** I have a gum-ache? No, probably not. So let me explain: I want to know **what good it will do**. I wonder, **what purpose** is served by my gum ache. Considering gum aches **in general**, can they be considered something that is intrinsically **bad**? I believe not. I could easily make up a story in which a gum ache served a definitely positive purpose. Gum aches **ache**, but they are not necessarily **bad**. Some pains may, in some circumstances, be good and desirable. I will spare you the examples. Back to **my** ache. Why **gum** ache, of all possible pains? and why **now**, here in Edam? This will be a good exercise in **understanding**. Hang on and find out.

Esti is leaving tomorrow. I am really very well organized (except for my gum ache...). I'll have to shift into high gear: So far I have written 16 pages in three days. The pace will have to double, if I am to accomplish anything. And I still haven't really explained what my thesis is about. All I have managed to say thus far is that I was led to formal logic, only to discover that it, like any other discipline, requires prior presuppositions and stipulated definitions. I found that philosophical debates are often about what the truth **ought** to be, not what it **is**. Pay attention to this distinction: We **do**, intuitively, primitively **understand** the claim "It *ought* to be so". We do **not** have the same, internal understanding of "It **is** so". The first statement is **ethical**: It claims that something is **good**. This is a notion as primitive as a notion can be. Desire, preference, inclination, is in our nature. The second statement is (supposedly) **empirical**: A statement of **fact**: It **is** so. I believe that "ethical" statements, **value** judgments, are something **universal**: Every speaker **means** the same thing when he says "I feel good". This is **not** the case with the statement "This object is red". But I seem to be putting the carriage before the horse. I took a variety of courses in Logic, all with Prof. Ruth Manor, who showed extreme patience in tolerating my constant interruptions. My thesis is on the point of intersection between Logic, epistemology, ontology and ethics, and it makes the following claim:

*Human conceptual schemes are governed by the simple rules of propositional calculus. The more complex predicate calculus is but a special case of propositional calculus, modeling the phenomenon known as natural language. This special case is characterized by the stipulated notion of objective **existence**, a notion of a public world. Every **theory** has, in principle, such a primitive notion, if it is to be **discussed**. For this joint enterprise (a public world) to succeed, Speakers do not only have to be assumed to be similar in their logical structure (propositional calculus), but also in their **intentional** nature: In their capacity to be attracted or repelled, to distinguish the good, the desirable, from the bad, or undesirable; a **moral** perception. These two characteristics constitute the basic structure of a **speaker** of a natural language. As to the **world**, it is a mere **product***

*of language. The structure of the world is a reflection of the way we understand our language. I propose a sort of ‘Copernican revolution’ regarding the essence of language: Language does not employ subjective moral terminology to describe an objective, factual reference; It does precisely the reverse: It employs subjective ontological terminology to describe an objective **moral** reference. In short: What there **is**, is what we, in employing language, eventually decide **ought** to be.²⁴*

This last paragraph clearly belongs below the line. Ignore it. Its nice indentation almost ruined the whole text I’ve written so far. I must be careful using features of *Word* I am not fully acquainted with. If it weren’t for Esti, who took a formal course in *Word* and helped me reconstruct the original format of the text, I would have been in trouble. And my gum is getting worse. And I feel I’m running a fever. And Esti is leaving me in the morning. I will be **completely** alone. I and my gum ache.

²⁴ This indented paragraph is important, so if you are just reading the footnotes, read it now. I propose there is a consistent, truth-preserving **reduction** of predicate logic to propositional calculus. Also, I shall propose a sort of new semantic interpretation to propositional calculus. Instead of a domain that has nothing but two truth values, T and F, my interpretation will consist of a domain of **properties**, once known as Platonic Ideas.